The First District Court of Appeal held that a local government may condition the issuance of a permit to build residential units on agricultural land on the developer’s willingness to record a restrictive covenant. Benedetti v. County of Marin, ___ Cal. App. 5th ___, 2025 WL 2490638 (Aug. 29, 2025)
The case concerned Marin County’s Local Coastal Program (LCP), which allows property owners in the “coastal agricultural production zone” to build new residential units only if they agree to a covenant requiring that the occupant of the unit be “actively and directly engaged in agricultural use of the property,” either through daily management of a commercial agricultural operation or by leasing to a bona fide agricultural producer.
The Benedetti family, which owns property in the coastal agricultural production zone, sought to build an additional residence on the property without agreeing to the restrictive covenant. They filed a lawsuit in Marin County Superior Court, arguing that the County’s LCP violated the unconstitutional-conditions takings framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The Benedettis contended that the covenant requirement failed both the nexus and proportionality requirements of that framework because it was insufficiently tailored to the County’s interest in preserving agriculture in the coastal zone. They also claimed that the ordinance violated their substantive due process rights by requiring them to engage in farming rather than their preferred vocation.
The trial court rejected both claims, reasoning in part that the Benedettis could not assert a facial Nollan/Dolan challenge to the County’s LCP. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It read the Supreme Court’s decision in Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, 601 U.S. 267 (2024), to allow for facial Nollan/Dolan claims.
On the merits, though, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court and rejected the Benedettis’ challenges. It concluded that the restrictive-covenant requirement in the LCP satisfied Nollan‘s nexus test because it had a “direct connection” to the County’s interest in preserving agricultural use and avoiding residential conversion of farmland. And the condition met Dolan‘s “rough proportionality” requirement—that is, it was “related both in nature and extent to the impact” of the proposed development because “residential development of any size or type that is not required and used to support ongoing agriculture begins to establish a market for residential development and erode the viability of agriculture.”
The Court of Appeal also rejected the Benedettis’ due process claim. Applying rational-basis review, it concluded that requiring farm-owner occupancy or agricultural leasing for additional housing was reasonably related to the County’s longstanding policy of farmland preservation. The fact that the covenant operates in perpetuity did not make it arbitrary in light of those goals.
For property owners and practitioners, the case offers two principal takeaways. First, while facial Nollan/Dolan claims may be formally available, they are difficult to win. A plaintiff must show that the government’s permitting condition is systematically unrelated or disproportionate to the impacts of a proposed development. That will likely be the case only in relatively extreme situations. More often, a plaintiff will have better odds of success in bringing an as-applied claim, which requires only a showing that the permit conditions violate the Nollan/Dolan framework in the particular circumstances of their proposed development.
Second, the Nollan/Dolan framework is not a promising avenue for challenging local governments’ zoning schemes, particularly in the coastal zone. While a number of California state laws in recent years have made it easier for many property owners to build additional dwelling units—in the form of ADUs, duplexes, and the like—those statutes did not help the Benedettis, on account of their property’s location in an area zoned for agricultural production under the County’s LCP. Courts remain highly deferential to local governments’ decisions to limit development on land zoned for agricultural purposes.